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A "Not Wholly Peaceful" Protest
On July 6, 1998, just before dawn, soldiers opened fire on a group of some two 
hundred demonstrators, in Biak City, on Biak Island, in Biak-Numfor Regency, in the 
Indonesian province of Irian Jaya.2 For four days, the demonstrators had been guarding
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a flag that flew on top of a water tower between the regency's main market and the 
port. They had raised the flag before dawn on July 2. Later that morning, at an open 
forum, their leader, a young civil servant named Philip Karma, read an oath of 
allegiance to West Papua, the name of the sovereign nation that Karma and others 
would like Irian Jaya to become. On behalf of the Papuan people, Karma vowed not to 
abandon the flag and urged Kofi Annan to come to Biak to hear their case. That 
afternoon, when the security forces attempted to break up the demonstration, the 
followers wounded several policemen and burned a military truck. On July 5, after 
negotiations with the demonstrators broke down, authorities issued an ultimatum. If 
the crowd did not lower the flag voluntarily, troops would remove it by force.
The shooting is said to have lasted from 5:30 to 7:00 a.m. Just how many people 
were injured and killed in the operation remains unclear. Colonel Edyono, the armed 
forces commander in Biak, initially announced that there were twenty-one casualties 
and no fatalities.3 Other sources have put the death toll between five and a hundred; 
reports of torture and disappearances abound.4 After the Indonesian Human Rights 
Commission investigated the incident, the military leader finally admitted that one 
man, Ruben Orboi, had been killed.5 Orboi's body had been carried out to the sea, the 
commander told reporters. Fearing further unrest, the soldiers had decided to conceal 
the death temporarily by hiding the corpse in a shallow, beachside grave. When I 
arrived in Biak in late July for a brief visit, bodies had begun washing up on Biak 
beaches. Although the government claimed to have proof that these corpses were 
victims of the tsunami that struck Papua New Guinea on July 18, the police ordered 
villagers to bury them immediately.6 When I left Biak in early August, Philip Karma 
remained in police custody, with gunshot wounds to both of his legs.7 It seems likely 
that the flag lowering cost many more than one of his supporters their lives.
The "Morning Star Flag," which the Biak demonstrators were guarding, was 
officially raised next to the Dutch flag on December 1,1961, less than a year before the 
United States and Australia brokered the deal that decided the fate of Netherlands
Tackle Fresh Irian Rally/' Reuters, July 7,1998; "Indonesians Dismantle Irian Separatist Flag Pole," 
Reuters, July 8,1998; and "Indonesian Activists Say Five Missing in Irian," Reuters, August 7,1998.
3 See "Irian Tribes Defy Slaughter," Sydney Morning Herald, July 8,1998; "Focus: Indonesian Troops 
Tackle Fresh Irian Rally," Reuters, July 7,1998; "Indonesians Dismantle Irian Separatist Flag Pole," 
Reuters, July 8,1998; and "Indonesian Church Groups: Two Shot Dead in Irian Jaya," Inside China, July 10, 
1998.
4 See Human Rights Watch, "Irian Jaya Detainees Denied Family Visits, Medical Care," July 9 1998; 
Survival International, "Urgent Action Needed: People Shot in Biak, West Papua/Irian," July 6,1998 and 
"Update from Biak," July 9,1998. According to Human Rights Watch, the military attack resulted in three 
confirmed fatalities. Ruben Orboi, discussed below, died on the scene, and two more of Karma's supporters 
died shortly after the military released them from detention. To date, ten others have been reported missing. 
See "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-independence Actions in Irian Jaya."
5 See Cendrawasih Pos, July 25,1998: l ,  4.
6 See "Lagi Sembilan Mayat Ditemukan di Biak Timur," Cendrawasih Pos, July 29,1998:1; "Masih Dalam 
Penyelidikan," Cendrawasih Pos, July 29,1998:1; "Korban Tsunami PNG di Biak Ditemukan Mencapai 28 
Orang," Cendrawasih Pos, August 1,1998:1; and "Fishermen Find Bodies Off Indonesian Coast," Guardian 
Weekly, August 9,1998:4; see also Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence 
Actions in Irian Jaya."
7 Convicted of rebellion for his role in the flag raising, Karma was sentenced to six and a half years in 
prison in January of this year. See "Irian Jaya Man Jailed Over Separatist Protest," AFP, January 31,1999.
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New Guinea.8 In 1949, when the rest of the Indies gained independence, the 
Netherlands had retained the western half of the island of New Guinea, arguing that it 
was preparing its "primitive" Papuans for self-rule. In 1962, facing high deficits, heavy 
U.S. pressure, and the threat of war, the Dutch agreed to relinquish the territory to 
Indonesia. A United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was 
established to oversee the transfer and to assist in preparations for an "Act of Free 
Choice" in which western New Guinea's inhabitants would have a chance to choose 
between remaining within Indonesia or founding an independent West Papuan state. It 
soon became clear that Indonesia would not honor the principle of "one man, one 
vote" in the plebiscite, which was scheduled for 1969.9 Headed by Ali Moertopo, a 
Special Operation for West Irian led the campaign for integration, often resorting to 
coercive means. When the Act was finally held, under the military's watchful eyes, 
1,000 carefully selected tribal leaders unsurprisingly opted for their homeland to 
remain a province of Indonesia.10 In the years leading up to the referendum, groups of 
urban Papuans staged demonstrations demanding genuine self-determination; others 
entered the forest and took up arms.11 According to one account, it was the Indonesian 
authorities who gave the budding movement its name: the Free Papua Operation or 
OPM.12
The flag raising on Biak coincided with demonstrations in several of Irian Jaya's 
other major cities: Sorong, Jayapura, and Wamena. The twenty-seventh anniversary of
8 See Robin Osborne, "The OPM and the Quest for West Papuan Unity," in Between Two Nations: The 
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and West Papuan Nationalism, ed. R. J. May (Bathurst, Australia: 
Brown, 1986), p. 2; see also Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985).
9 For a discussion of the Act of Free Choice (AFC), as stipulated under the New York Agreement, see Peter 
Savage, "The National Liberation Struggle in West Irian: From Millenarianism to Socialist Revolution," 
Asian Survey 18,10 (1978): 986. "The organization of the AFC was to include: (a) consultations with the 
representative councils of the nine regions on the procedures and methods to be followed for ascertaining 
the freely expressed decision of the people; (b) a clear formulation of whether or not Indonesia was to 
continue in control; (c) a guarantee of the eligibility of all indigenous inhabitants to participate in the AFC, 
which was to be carried out in accordance with international practice; and (d) the establishment by 
Indonesian-Netherlands consultation of the exact time of the AFC, which was to take place before the end of 
1969. Indonesia under article XXII of the Agreement also undertook the following, without which the 
previous provisions would be meaningless: to guarantee the human rights of the inhabitants of West Papua 
New Guinea [sic], including the rights of free speech and freedom of movement and assembly."
In 1962, the head of the Indonesian mission to UNTEA and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
"suggested that a plebiscite through suffrage would be too difficult, and that the wishes of the people should 
be determined through consultation [musjawarah] with community leaders." Between 1962 and 1968, local 
leaders were pressed into signing resolutions supporting Indonesian rule and deeming the referendum 
unnecessary. Ibid., p. 985. See also John R. G. Djopari, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Jakarta: 
Rasindo, 1993), pp. 72-3.
10 Although the settlement called for UN supervision, the only observers allowed to be on hand for the 
plebiscite were a Bolivian diplomat—who spoke no Indonesian—and a skeletal staff. See Savage, "The 
National Liberation Struggle in West Irian," pp. 986-7.
11 See "Former Governor of West Irian Interviewed by TAPOL," Tapol Bulletin 48 (November 1981): 9-10.
12 See Djopari, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, p. 100. As far as titles go, the direct precursor to 
the OPM was the Organisasi dan Perjuangan Menuju Kemerdekaan Papua Barat, whose leader, Terianus 
Aronggeor, was captured in Manokwari in 1964. The name OPM gained currency in 1965, after Permenas 
Ferry Awom launched a guerilla campaign against the Indonesian army.
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the OPM's Declaration of West Papuan Independence fell on July 1, 1998, a little over 
a month following the resignation of Indonesia's President Suharto after thirty-three 
years in office.13 The Indonesian province of Irian Jaya was bom during the same 
decade as Suharto's "New Order" regime. Suharto commanded a military mission 
intended to retake "West Irian" in 1961, four years before coming to power in the 
aborted coup and state-sponsored massacres that destroyed the Indonesian 
Communist Party and forced the Republic's first president to resign. In Irian Jaya, 
Suharto's sudden removal from public office served to revive old hopes. Irian Jayans 
had no doubt heard of the riots that swept Jakarta and other major Indonesian cities in 
May 1998, as well as the peaceful student protests that preceded them. Those with 
televisions may have seen images of the students who occupied the parliament building 
during Suharto's final days. Between rounds of chanting and singing, the protesters 
chatted with young soldiers, who smiled, their weapons idle at their sides. The brutal 
response of Indonesian troops to the pro-independence protests in Irian Jaya provided 
a lesson in the limits of reformasi, as this brave new era in Indonesian politics has been 
dubbed. "These people were not demanding reform; they wanted a separate state," 
the commander in Biak explained.14 Against such a "betrayal of the nation," added 
General Wiranto, the chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, "firm action" was 
required.15
One need not look far for a straightforward explanation of the flag raising and its 
aftermath on Biak. "This really isn't a new problem," said one Biak friend, voicing a 
sentiment widely shared in the province. "People want a fair referendum so they can 
decide their fate." It is not surprising that Indonesia's new rulers oppose such a 
proposal. Shortly after Suharto's fall, several members of the US Congress sent a letter 
to B. J. Habibie, the current president, and Amien Rais, his most powerful opponent, 
calling for dialogue on the political status of East Timor and Irian Jaya. While 
Indonesia has proven open to negotiations on East Timor, both Habibie and Rais 
indicated in July 1998 that they would draw the line at Indonesia's resource-rich 
easternmost province.16 In the fall, there was some softening of this stance, with plans 
going ahead for a "national dialogue" between Irianese leaders and the Indonesian 
national government.17 But when one hundred representatives from the province
13 Ibid, p. 116. See also Osborne, "The OPM and the Quest for West Papuan Unity," p. 55.
14 See "Irian Tribes Defy Slaughter," Sydney Morning Herald, July 8,1998.
15 Ibid. See also "Focus: Indonesian Troops Tackle Fresh Irian Rally," July 7,1998.
16 See "Indonesia's Black Death," Sydney Morning Herald, November 11,1998.
17 See "Jakarta Ready to Hold Dialogue on Irian Jaya: MP," AFP, October 19,1998; "Habibie Setuju 
Berdialog dengan Tokoh Irian Jaya," Kompas, October 27,1998; "Irianese Want More than Pledge of 
Dialog," Jakarta Post, January 23,1998. Spearheading the campaign for a national dialogue is FORERI, 
Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (The Forum for the Recondlation of the Irian Jayan People), which 
came into being in the wake of the July demonstrations, following a fact-finding mission led by the deputy 
speaker of the national parliament, Abdul Gafur. FORERI's founding members include Herman Saud, Synod 
Chair of the Irian Jaya Gospel Church (Gereja Kristen Injil Irian Jaya); Leo Laba Lajar, Bishop of 
Jayapura; Theys Eluway, Chair of the Irian Customary Council Institute (Lembaga Dewan Adat Irian); Tom 
Beanal, Chair of the Foundation for Customary Consultation of the Amungme Tribe (Lembaga Musyawarah 
Adat Suku Amungme), Presidium member of WAHLI, Indonesia's pre-eminent environmental organization, 
and former delegate to the provincial parliament; Martinus Werimon, Chair of the Student Senate of 
Cendrawasih University; the Chair of the Student Senate of I. S. Kijne Seminary of the GKI; and feminist 
activist Yusan Yeblo.
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presented Habibie with a demand for independence in a February 26 "pre-meeting" in 
Jakarta, the president told them to go home and think again.18 Reports that the armed 
forces had a hand in orchestrating the July demonstrations in Irian Jaya are not entirely 
implausible. Military officers have a stake in the designation of certain provinces as 
"unstable." Former commanders often live out their retirement in East Timor or Irian 
Jaya so they can reap the harvest of profitable business deals made in the areas under 
their command. While the assault came later than it would have under Suharto—when 
flag raisings lasted minutes, not days—the brutal treatment of the demonstrators 
followed a familiar script, in which soldiers protect the Republic from the enemy 
within.
I would not want to underplay the long history of broken promises, corruption, and 
discrimination that has led to demands for an independent West Papuan state. Nor 
would I want to downplay the collusion of individual, institutional, and international 
interests in the continuance of Indonesian rule. At the same time, I would not want to 
leave the impression that the "symbolic" and the "political" aspects of the incident 
belong to separate domains. According to the commander in Biak, only fifty of the 
demonstrators were "hardcore" separatists; the other three hundred were "deluded" 
by promises of miraculous improvements in conditions and the belief that something 
religious was going on.19 A critique of this attempt to explain away the "disturbance" 
must go further than asserting that religion provided a "language" for the protestors. 
An interpretation of the flag raising must pay heed to the metaphysical underpinnings 
of all modem states, be they imaginary or "real."
In an intelligent, meticulous report on the July demonstrations, Sidney Jones of 
Human Rights Watch notes, quite accurately, that the pro-independence actions in 
Irian Jaya were "not all wholly peaceful."20 This comment confirms what upon 
reflection should seem obvious. Violence was not simply a means to an end in the flag 
raising (and flag lowering); it was crucial to the very meaning of both gestures. Wfriat 
was at stake in that contested piece of cloth was Indonesia's very status as a state, as 
defined by its ability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.21 This 
monopoly was challenged not only by the demonstrators' attack on the police, but also
18See "Irianese Leaders Want Control of Their Land," Jakarta Post, February 27,1999; "Habibie about 
Irian: Contemplate Again That Demand for Independence," Kompas Online, February 28,1999. For an 
English translation of the statement delivered to Habibie, see "West Papuans Demanding for Free West 
Papua," Kabar Irian, February 17 newsgroup posting. The statement stipulates that if their demand for 
independence is not met, that the "people of West Papua" will boycott the general elections in 1999. Freddy 
Numberi, the current governor, has interpreted Habibie's response as implying the case for independence is 
closed; his own proposal calls for greater autonomy. See "Irian Governor Calls for 'Special Autonomy,"' 
Media Indonesia, March 11,1999; "Irian Jaya: Government Rejects Demand for Independence," Antara, 
March 13,1999; "Government Rejects Demand for Irian Independence," Kompas, March 15,1999. On the 
threats received by members of the delegation upon their return to Jayapura, see Amnesty International, 
"Fear for Safety/Threats and Intimidation; Hermanus Wayoi, Don Flassy, Workers at ELS-HAM, a local 
human rights organizations," AI Index: ASA 21/16/99 , March 9,1999.
19 See Cendrawasih Pos, July 14,1998:1.
20 "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya."
21 See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. 
W. Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970); see also Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" in 
Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, Edmund Jephcott, trans. (New York: Schocken, 
1978), pp. 277-300.
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by the oath that legitimized the assault. The demonstration began, one should recall, 
with a performative: a forceful, self-fulfilling gesture.22 Karma's declaration created its 
own truth by constituting its own subject, the "West Papuan" people in whose name 
he promised never to abandon the flag. For a brief period, in one small corner of 
Indonesia, the demonstrators violently established the legitimacy of an alternative 
regime.
If the flag raising was a "performative," then the shootings could be read as an 
attempt to prevent the founding of West Papua from becoming "felicitous," that is, a 
speech event undertaken in a discursive context that guarantees that such an oath will 
shape future action. Against the soldiers' guns, the demonstrators mobilized higher 
powers to ground their tautological words and deeds: "God, the Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost," who were named as witnesses to the pledge. At the Biak water tower, as 
elsewhere, the violent birth of a nation entailed an appeal to the transcendent.23 But 
the logic of the nation-state only captures one aspect of the confrontation, which 
brought together a multiplicity of conceptions of the relationship of violence to order, 
origins, and truth.
In this essay I explore the intersection between these multiple conceptions. I offer a 
tentative answer to a question many on Biak found important: what gave those young 
demonstrators the courage to face up to armed soldiers? I seek a response not only in 
Papuan nationalism and the recent experience of Indonesian rule, but also in the long 
tradition of Biak millenarianism. I show how this tradition finds its basis in everyday 
practices that transform what is foreign into a source of value, authority, and prestige. 
From foreign porcelain to government slogans, Biaks have tended to valorize objects 
and texts that they take as traces of encounters with dangerous outsiders. The violence 
of a clash between worldviews is posited in many of the processes through which 
Biaks create their identities and seek status and power. This valorization of the 
foreign, taken alone, cannot account for the pro-independence protests in Biak.
22 On performatives, see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (London: Oxford University Press,
1976); John Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in Language and Social Context, ed. Pier P. Gigioli (London: 
Penguin, 1965), pp. 136-54; Jacques Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context" in Margins c f  Philosophy, Samuel 
Weber, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 307-330. The relationship between violence 
and order in a foundational moment, such as that posited in die flag raising, is over-determined. Some 
writers on violence have stressed its own performative structure, arguing that the violent act both signifies 
and enforces its own legitimacy by providing a pre-emptive strike that silences dissent. See David Riches, 
"Aggression, Warfare and Violence: Space/Time and Paradigm," Man N. S. 26:281-98 and Christian 
Krohn-Hansen, "The Anthropology of Violent Interaction," Journal o f  Anthropological Research 50 (4): 367- 
382. Legally sanctioned violence, in turn, refers back to an equally performative act of force: the law 
founding utterance that creates its own legitimacy, after the fact. On this problem, see Jacques Derrida, 
"Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority'" in Deconstruction and the Possibility o f Justice, 
ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 3-67.
23 See B. Honig, "Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problems of Founding a 
Republic," American Political Science Review 85, 1 (1991): 97-113 and Benjamin Lee, Talking Heads: 
Language, Metalanguage and the Semiotics c f  Subjectivity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 338- 
341. Lee describes the double lines of authority that underwrite the US Declaration of Independence, one 
stretching "through the self-evident laws of nature to God, the ultimate, eternal, transcendental 
countersignatory''; the other "to the just announced and contested 'good people of the colonies. The radical 
performativity of the latter is legitimated by the transcendent authority of the former." Ibid., p. 328.
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Nevertheless, at critical moments, a distinctively messianic vision has shaped the way 
Biaks envision and pursue political change.
For many Biaks, "God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost" is really Manarmakeri, the 
Biak ancestor responsible for the wealth and power of outsiders. However Philip 
Karma's oath may have followed a familiar model for the founding of a nation; in the 
very act of appealing to the divine, Karma may have allowed for a shift into a 
narrative premised on very different assumptions on the nature of power, space, and 
time. But if I approach the flag raising as a millennial moment, I also pay heed to the 
equally violent narratives of transformation promulgated by the Indonesian regime. To 
set the stage for this analysis, I begin by briefly considering the broader institutional 
forces that have encouraged Biaks to participate in the Papuan nationalist movement, 
from its earliest stages to the present day.
Papuan Nationalism and Biak Cosmopolitanism
Rising from the Pacific at the mouth of Cendrawasih Bay, roughly two hundred 
kilometers off the New Guinea mainland, three small islands and a scattering of atolls 
make up the Indonesian Regency of Biak-Numfor. Over the territory's colonial and 
postcolonial history, the inhabitants of these islands have sometimes appeared as 
exemplary of "Papuan" or "Irianese" identity, sometimes as the exception that proves 
the rule. Biak speaking seafarers were among the first of New Guinea's inhabitants to 
confront European traders, missionaries, and officials, by virtue of their longstanding 
tributary relations with the Moluccan Sultanate of Tidore. By 1920, the Netherlands 
Indies military had "pacified" the islands. By the early 1930s, the vast majority of 
Biaks had converted to Protestantism, and almost every village featured a mission 
church and school. In the late 1940s, one official observed that illiteracy was "virtually 
nonexistent" among Biak men below the age of thirty-five.24 At a time when the 
ancestors of today's Dani and Amungme had yet to encounter Europeans, Biak 
evangelists were spreading the Gospel along New Guinea's northern coast. Biak's 
longstanding experience with outsiders made islanders fodder for early Dutch 
descriptions of the custom and character of "the Papuan."25 In the 1950s, when the 
Dutch retained western New Guinea as a separate colony, Biaks and other coastal 
Papuans continued to play a central role in colonial representations of the territory's 
natives, as well as in policies designed to cultivate an educated Papuan elite. Dutch 
propaganda featured before and after photographs, opposing scantily clad tribesmen 
from the highlands to smiling coastal workers.26 Figures from Biak, Sentani, and other 
places with a long history of contact stood in for the "modem" Papuan this new 
civilizing mission promised to produce.
24 See Jan Victor de Bruyn, "Jaarverslagen 1947 en 1948 van Onderafdeling Biak," Nienhuis Collectie van 
de Department van Bevolkingszaken, Nurruner Toegang 10-25, Stuk 188 (The Hague: Algemeene Rijksarchief, 
1948), p. 7.
25 "De bevolking van Biak en het kolonisatievraagstuk van Noord Nieuw-Guinea," Tijdschrift Nieuw 
Guinea 1: 169-177.
26 See, for example, Vademecum voor Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea (Rotterdam: New Guinea Institute in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Overseas Territories, 1956).
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By making "progress" appear as the outcome of Dutch intervention, these images 
obscure the accidents of geography and history that have made places like Biak and 
Jayapura what they are today: relatively urban, cosmopolitan, multiethnic sites in a 
vast, sparsely populated province. During World War II, when the war in the Pacific 
started to turn against Japan, the Occupation forces began building what is now the 
longest runway in Indonesia on Biak Island; the Allies completed the project during 
MacArthur's famous "island hopping" campaign, after driving out the Japanese.27 
After the war, the Dutch expanded the airport and the surrounding settlement, 
building on the foundations of the American military base. Today, in addition to an 
international airport, Biak City boasts a port, a canning factory, a plymill, three 
markets, two supermarkets, numerous shops, hotels, restaurants, and karaoke bars, 
three military posts, and countless government offices. It is home to Makassarese and 
Sino-Indonesian merchants, officials and soldiers from Java, Bali, Sumatra, Ambon, 
and other distant Indonesian islands, a handful of Western visitors, and a large 
community of Irian Jayans from other tribes. Urban Biaks include everyone from the 
Regent to NGO directors to teachers, day laborers, taxi conductors, nurses, and low- 
paid government clerks. Among their numbers is a growing population of young, 
unemployed high school graduates and drop-outs, many of whom while away their 
days at the taxi terminal near the main market. Some are waiting for job openings in 
the civil service, which, despite its expansion under the New Order, can absorb only a 
fraction of those who apply. In addition, at any one time, Biak City is a temporary 
home to scores of rural Biaks: fishermen selling their catch, subsistence farmers 
marketing their extra fruit and vegetables, seasonal construction workers, and children 
staying with relatives while they attend school. In recent years, the Indonesian 
government has extended roads and bridges to distant coastal villages, making it 
easier for villagers to travel to market and for elite Biaks to build retirement homes on 
their clan land. With luck, one can make it to Biak City from almost anywhere in the 
islands in less than five hours. In the early 1990s, when Biak was a refueling stop on 
the route between Los Angeles and Jakarta, Honolulu was less than twelve hours 
away. Biak bureaucrats and academics, traveling to Jakarta, Townsville or Leiden, 
sometimes boarded these international flights.
Below, I discuss in detail the distinctive values that orient Biaks' participation in 
social arenas that extend far beyond the local setting. But at this point, it is worth 
noting how conditions in Biak bring into sharp relief grievances shared by other Irian 
groups. Biak-Numfor is the most densely populated regency in Irian Jaya, and one of 
the least fertile. Yet in recent years, Biaks have had to surrender clan land for a range 
of projects, from a satellite launcher to a transmigration site to a five-star resort. Biak 
fishermen complain of declining yields as commercial trawlers deplete the coastal 
stocks. As elsewhere in the province, non-Irian Jayans dominate the urban economy, 
owning everything from the taxis villagers ride to town to the shops where they buy 
sugar and rice.28 Makassarese traders monopolize the choicest stalls in the central
27 See Robert Ross Smith, The US Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, vol. 3: The Approach to the 
Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), pp. 280-396.
28 On the role of migrants in the provincial economy, see R. Gamaut and C. Manning, Irian Jaya: The 
Transformation o f  a Melanesian Economy (Canberra: ANU Press, 1974) and Chris Manning and Michael 
Rumbiak, "Irian Jaya: Economic Change, Migrants, and Indigenous Welfare" in Unity and Diversity:
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market, leaving local producers to crouch along the outer aisles or in the dirt outside. 
Local residents also find themselves pushed to the margins in the competition for 
government benefits. To the consternation of Biak parents, the children of migrants 
from outside the province often win jobs and scholarships reserved for the locally 
bom. Biaks are well aware of the province's vast reserves of minerals and natural gas; 
some have seen the Freeport mines first hand. They are also aware that public services 
in the province are woefully inadequate. Even in this relatively accessible regency, 
classrooms stand empty, and clinics are understaffed and under stocked. Above all, 
as I elaborate below, Biaks share with other Irian Jayans indelible memories of state 
terror. Some still carry scars (and in some cases bullets) from the turbulent 1970s, 
when the Indonesian military attacked North and West Biak villages to flush out 
armed guerillas. Under the New Order, activists who criticized government policies 
were often accused of harboring separatist sympathies. Biaks learned from decades of 
extra-judicial violence that the label OPM could be the "kiss of death."29
But it is not enough simply to point to this memoria passionis, "history of suffering," 
to understand why the dream of self-determination has not only survived, but thrived 
in Biak and Irian Jaya more generally.30 The past four decades have introduced a range 
of shared experiences that have made an independent West Papua imaginable for 
growing numbers of the province's inhabitants. Chi the one hand, one must consider the 
circumference of the "administrative pilgrimages" taken by the provincial elite.31 No 
matter how much overseas training they may have received, the majority of Irianese 
bureaucrats, soldiers and academics have pursued their careers in the space between 
Sorong (not Sabang!) and Merauke, i.e. within the borders of what is now Irian Jaya.32 
The same elite has long sustained the separatist movement, both in Irian Jaya and 
overseas.33 While Biaks have no monopoly on OPM leadership—or high-ranking 
government posts—suitable examples emerge from their ranks. Marcus Kaisiepo, West
Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970, ed. Hal Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), pp. 77-106.
29 See "OPM is 'The Kiss of Death,; Says MP," Tapol Bulletin 43 (January 1980): 5.
30See J. Budi Hemawan OFM and Theo van den Broek OFM of the Secretariat for Justice and Peace of the 
Jayapura Diosese, "Dialog Nasional Papua: Sebuah Kisah 'Memoria Passionis,'" Tifa Irian, March 12, 
Internet posting March 25.
31 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 53-56. For this analysis, I 
am also drawing on pp. 170-178, where Anderson explicitly considers the roots of Papuan nationalism in 
provincial icons and institutions.
32 Some Biak leaders claim that an important source of resentment lies in the fact that western Indonesians 
are frequently sent to serve in Irian Jaya, but Irianese officials are rarely sent to serve in western 
Indonesian provinces.
33 See "Former Governor of West Irian Interviewed," Tapol Bulletin 49 (January 1982): 5, where D. Kafiar, 
a Papuan refugee, comments on the composition of the OPM in the field. "Many come from the towns. Young 
people and government officials from the lowest to the highest ranks." See also Amunggut Tabi, Kabar Irian, 
January i ,  1999. In this posting, which clarifies "the aspirations of the West Papuan People and the 
position of the OPM" one scarcely gets the sense that the provincial elite is to be criticized for working for 
the Indonesian state. "2. It is true that some West Papuans currently enjoy Indonesian government positions 
and a measure of wealth and freedom, but deep within our hearts we will never possess any real peace or
satisfaction until all our people are free, and this is the essence of our struggle___ 8. All West Papuans will
be treated equally in the new nation, including persons currently serving under the Republic of Indonesia, 
such as the current governor of Irian Jaya and the rector of Cendrawasih University."
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Papua's first "president-in-exile," was a graduate of the Netherlands New Guinea 
School for Native Administrators; Permenas Ferry Awom, leader of the 1965 
Manokwari rebellion, was a member of the Papuan Volunteer Brigade; Seth Rumkorem, 
the "brigadier general" from the OPM faction that declared independence in 1971, was 
an officer in the Indonesian army; Arnold Ap, promoter of Papuan culture and martyr 
to the separatist cause, was a lecturer at the provincial university and the curator of a 
museum of provincial art.34 While it seems likely that he acted on his own, without the 
involvement of established separatist groups, Philip Karma, the organizer of the Biak 
flag raising, fits the profile of a typical OPM leader.35 Son of the first Biak to serve as a 
regent, Karma was, until his arrest, a mid-level official in the provincial administration. 
Like so many nationalists before him, he is the product of the system he risked his life 
to overturn. On the other hand, one must pay heed to the unifying effects of provincial 
initiatives from internet newsgroups to newspapers like the Cendrawasih Pos and Tifa 
Irian to government sponsored contests promoting provincial costumes and dances. 
These technologies account for how Irian's highly diverse population has come to 
express a sense of shared purpose, despite the disunity that has often plagued the 
OPM.36
The new imaginings made possible by contemporary institutions and modes of 
communication played a crucial role in the flag raising on Biak. But there is more to the 
story, as the rest of this essay should confirm. My understanding of the July protest is 
based on the straightforward proposition that it is possible for people to invoke 
different identities and address different audiences, both across settings and in the 
course of single social interaction.37 Whether one has in mind the reading of a 
newspaper or the raising of a flag, representations are always in some sense 
underdetermined.38 Although interpretations of a performance are always contextually 
based, no single context is ever exhaustive of all the possible meanings of an event. 
This is not to deny that some readings are more powerful or pronounced than others; 
the challenge is to consider how contrasting and even contradictory frameworks can
34 On the backgrounds of various OPM leaders, see Djopari, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, pp. 
100-131; Nonie Sharp with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, The Morning Staf in Papua Barat (North Carlton, 
Australia; Arena, 1994); Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 178.
35 Neither the Papuan exiles I spoke with in Holland in September, nor the human rights activists I later 
consulted, were aware of any connection between Philip Karma and any pre-existing separatist 
organizations. I was told that Karma only decided to organize the demonstration after arriving on Biak, 
where he had come to visit his ailing father.
36 Recent events provide numerous examples of such expressions of shared purpose. In May of 1998,
Irianese college students and human rights advocates rallied in Jayapura and Jakarta for the withdrawal of 
troops from the Central Highlands. These demonstrations followed the widely publicized issuing of a 
report by Irianese religious leaders to the National Human Rights Commission documenting abuses in 
Mapnduma, an isolated region whose inhabitants the vast majority of Irianese will never meet. See Human 
Rights Watch, "Indonesia Alert: Trouble in Irian Jaya." The importance of communications technology to 
the Papuan nationalist movement is reflected in a recent posting by the OPM spokesman, Amunggut Tabi, 
calling for support so he can establish an email network for West Papuan tribal leaders. See Kabar Irian, 
March 15,1999.
37 See Joseph Errington, Shifting Languages: Interaction and Identity in Javanese Indonesian (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially pp. 4-5.
38 See Webb Keane, Signs o f  Recognition: Powers and Hazards o f Representation in an Indonesian Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
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intersect in historically grounded and systematic ways. Among Irian Jayans, one sees 
evidence of such an intersection on the provincial level, where nationalist 
pronouncements reflect the influence of a long history of mission involvement. Papuan 
separatists may describe themselves as members of a global order of nations, but they 
also depict their "imagined community" in explicitly Christian terms.39 In the case of 
Biak, the very values that have prompted the islanders to participate in provincial 
struggles underwrite a resilient set of millennial expectations. Sometimes, many Biaks 
do seem to envision themselves as part of a politically silenced Papuan nation 
advancing in "homogeneous, empty time." But there is a broadly shared tendency to 
interpret international acknowledgment of this identity as initiating an eschatological 
transformation. From this perspective, independence appears as the utopian moment 
when Biak will be revealed as the true origin of earthly power. At other times, Biaks 
downplay this millennial/nationalist vision through practices that posit a very 
different sense of self. Nationalism is often depicted as involving the recognition of an 
interiorized locus of identity.40 In Biak, this interiority stands in tension with the 
assumption that one gains status from being foreign: different from oneself and one's 
peers.
Later in this essay, I develop this argument by looking more closely at the character 
of Biak sociality. But first, I attend to another force of critical importance in the flag 
raising and its aftermath: the Indonesian state. John Djopari has noted that Irianese 
youths who have fled Indonesia finally feel free to express their convictions. "Perhaps 
when they are in Irian Jaya they restrain themselves," he remarks.41 With the end of the 
New Order, Biaks and other Irian Jayans suddenly found themselves living in what 
they took to be a new and different land. Unfortunately, the changes were not as 
radical as they may have seemed, as I suggest in the following section, where I examine 
the logic underlying the military's brutal suppression of the demonstration. On Biak at 
least, state terror has persisted in uncannily familiar forms.
The New Order and the Ends of Violence
When one considers the conditions under which President Suharto ruled, it is 
surprising that his fall did not come sooner. The New Order's longevity, as John 
Pemberton has noted, did not rest solely on open coercion or threat. To account for the 
quiescence that reigned in much of Indonesia for the period of Suharto's rule, 
Pemberton looks not to a "culture of terror," but a "relatively muted form of terror that 
might become culture: the repression of fear that customarily secures, over time, an 
appearance of normal life."42 With fear transposed into anxiety over the specter of 
cultural incompletion, the Javanese population at Indonesia's core embraced the
39 See Tabi, Kabar Irian, January 1,1999. "The future nation of West Papua shall not tolerate military 
dictatorship of any kind, but shall be ruled by civilians. It will be the only nation on Earth to acknowledge 
the Bible as exclusive source for all its laws."
40 See James Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); John 
Pemberton, On the Subject o f  "Java" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 134, and Marilyn Ivy, 
Discourses o f  the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
41 See Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Barat, p. 151.
42 See Pemberton, On the Subject o f  "Java," p. 8.
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official virtues of order, stability, and progress. Seeing themselves from the perspective 
of the abstract authority of "custom," they engaged in compulsive rounds of state- 
sanctioned rituals. Mobilized to create the impression of an imperishable order, the 
transcendent realm of "culture" bridged the ruptures of colonial and postcolonial 
history. Building museums filled with new heirlooms and improved versions of old 
monuments, the New Order subsumed old and new, originals and replicas, into an 
abstract topology of clearly demarcated regional cultures and selves.
When I was conducting fieldwork on Biak from 1992 to 1994,1 found no dearth of 
expressions of the official narratives of culture and development that Pemberton so 
astutely dissects. The "security approach" had given way to the "prosperity 
approach," I was told, by officials committed to the revival of Biak "tradition" and 
the entry of the population into the ranks of orderly Indonesian subjects.43 But 
alongside official discourses that assured Biaks that order and progress was what they 
desired was another set of narratives with a more sinister message for those who 
strayed from the official path. While I was free to travel to most parts of the island, I 
was warned against venturing to West Biak, a place that remained "disturbed" by the 
presence of an OPM commander who had managed to survive decades of counter­
insurgency operations on the island. In 1990, Indonesian troops shot the guerilla's 
nephew, who had fled to the forest after a flag raising in a West Biak village. Carrying 
their victim's severed head aloft on a pole, the troops marched home along the densely 
populated coast.44 In this grisly spectacle, the soldiers took on the lethal power of the 
headhunters who once inhabited the island.45 The state had the capacity not only to 
annihilate their "primitive" rivals, but also to tap their savage, excessive power.
The events of last May decisively shattered the illusion that the New Order was 
eternal. But the logic that linked order and violence under Suharto is still not a thing of 
the past. Evidence has emerged of military involvement in the rape and murder of 
ethnic Chinese Indonesians in Jakarta and other major cities in the weeks leading up to 
Suharto's fall.46 The riots could be read as an effort to repeat the violent moment of the 
New Order's birth, when certain factions orchestrated an eruption of local animosities, 
then intervened to restore the law. The military on Biak seems to have tried to follow  a 
similar script. In the days following the flag raising, the provincial paper reported on a 
counter-demonstration carried out by villagers from West Biak.47 Other sources suggest 
that the military not only coerced West Biak villagers into protesting the flag raising;
43 See Danilyn Rutherford, "Of Birds and Gifts: Revising Tradition on an Indonesian Frontier/' Cultural 
Anthropology 11 (4): 577-616.
44 See Amnesty International, "Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in Irian Jaya," Country 
Dossier ASA 21 /06 /91 , Microform E 151 ,1991, p. 25.
45 Compare James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-revolution Today (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998), pp. 8,90-119; see also janet Hoskins, "Introduction: Headhunting as Practice and 
Trope" in Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia, ed. Janet Hoskins (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 31-37 and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, In the Realm o f  the Diamond Queen 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 72-103.
46 See John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's 
New Order," Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 159-196, esp. 179-182.
47 See Cendrawasih Pos, July 14,1998:1; see also TAPOL, "Situation Tense in Biak," Unpublished internet 
posting, July 5,1998.
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they also set in motion a plan to bring them to the site of the demonstration.48 Armed 
with axes and machetes, the West Biaks were supposed to start a battle with the 
demonstrators, giving die security forces an excuse to step in.49
Few Biaks reading of the counter-protests would have been ignorant of the heavy 
price West Biaks have paid for sheltering the last armed fugitive on the island. Equally 
few could have avoided hearing of the abuse suffered by the protesters and others 
unlucky enough to be near the water tower at the time of the attack. Two sets of 
narratives told different stories about the event, the first depicting the state's lethal 
power over its critics, the second assuring the faithful that chaos had been firmly, but 
gently, contained. The effectiveness of their interplay was evidenced in the aftermath 
of the shootings. Only a handful of families dared to report that their children were 
missing. The lack of complaints was used as evidence that no abuses had occurred. 
The authorities' effort to explain the sea-borne bodies as victims of a distant disaster 
was more than an exercise in damage control. It was an explicit demonstration of the 
state's monopoly over the giving and taking of identities, as well as lives.
Clearly, the tsunami was a stroke of good luck for the authorities; it gave them a 
chance to cover the traces of the massacre by providing a "natural" explanation for 
any recovered victims. But the argument that the corpses could not be the 
demonstrators because they were not Indonesians suited the strange logic of Indonesian 
state terror and sharpened the point of the military attack. Jim Siegel has recently 
pointed out that Indonesians have tended to "kill in their own image."50 Extra-legal 
violence against separatists, communists, and criminals alike is not intended to purify 
the nation of alien elements, but to demonstrate the state's ability to appropriate their 
potency, i.e. to "nationalize death."51 The soldiers who shot the young Biaks acted on 
the assumption that their victims belonged within the Indonesian state. This is not to 
deny that intruders of various sorts took part in the affair, including the American 
politicians mentioned above, whose letter reached the province, where it circulated 
widely. The authorities presented themselves as defusing these disruptions by 
translating them into manageable terms. Just as the authorities reassured the alarmed 
villagers by determining the true identity of the foreign corpses, they clarified the true 
meaning of the foreign letter, which called for limited autonomy, not independence, 
they claimed. Against the public secret of the state's "world destroying"—and order 
confirming—violence, the official version made violence alien to the law.52
48 See Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya."
491 was told that the West Biaks agreed to play their part in the drama only after the commander promised 
to let them recover from the forest the remains of loved ones killed by the military in earlier decades. The 
grim charade allowed the bereaved to demonstrate their loyalty. Otherwise, the simple act of burying the 
dead would have branded them as opponents of the state.
50 See Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta, p. 1.
51 Ibid., p. 108.
52 See Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking o f the World (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985).
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Biak and the Ends of Order
Among Biaks, one encounters a starkly different conception of the relationship 
between violence, order, and origins. A few months after I began fieldwork, I found 
myself talking with a new friend about her husband, a mild-mannered teacher whom I 
had met on several occasions. Jan was "jahat," Fransina told me, using an Indonesian 
word meaning "wicked" or "evil." Just as surprising as Fransina's choice of words was 
the boastful tone of her voice. As time went on, I met other Biaks who used the 
adjective, jahat, as a compliment. A jahat person, though for the most part reserved, 
was capable of outbursts of violent rage.53 This capacity for violence was not only 
admired in fishermen or hunters. Top officials liked to describe themselves as present 
day mambri, the fearsome "warriors" for whom Biak was once renowned.
The other way that top officials liked to describe themselves was as amber beba, 
"big foreigners." A word meaning "Westerner, non-Irianese Indonesian, civil servant, or 
individual with special skills," amber also can be used as an adjective to describe the 
outside realms where Biaks seek wealth and prestige. From the first appearance of 
Biak-speaking seafarers in European records, one finds an association of the foreign 
with both violence and value. Powerful outsiders, ranging from the Sultan of Tidore, to 
whom Biaks delivered tribute, to the agents of the Dutch colonial state, attracted both 
fear and desire. Today's Biaks recreate the linkage between violence and value in the 
most intimate arenas of everyday life. Biak kinship divides the islanders into 
patrilineal, exogamous clans. Where same sex siblings tend to be rivals for clan 
resources, cross-sex siblings regard each other with longing and love. Elsewhere I have 
analyzed the connection between this affection and the inflationary logic of Biak 
exchange.54 The status of a Biak brother—and his clan, more generally—depends on 
his and his clan's ability to give their affines more foreign valuables than they receive 
as bridewealth. Children become "foreigners" by virtue of the gifts their mother elicits 
from her brothers, who acquire this surplus through ongoing "raids" on foreign lands. 
Biaks speak of these gifts as motivated by a brother's "love" for his sister. But the 
aesthetics of the feasts that sisters host to elicit foreign valuables from their brothers 
portrays the giving of these prestations as an act of force. Everything from the guests' 
noisy procession to the dance ground to the songs they sing when they arrive recalls the 
violence of an encounter with the new.
But it is not only at feasts that Biaks stress the violence and value of the foreign. 
They confirm these qualities in narratives recounting the origins of social groups. Many 
stories about the founding of lineages, for instance, focus on the actions of mambri, the 
warriors mentioned above. In the past, warriors offered themselves for hire to feuding 
clans. The offended party got the warrior drunk, then spat in his cup to insult him, 
before sending him off in the direction of the offending village. Like a detonated 
missile, the infuriated warrior killed the first person to cross his path. The victim's 
relatives avenged the death by hiring another warrior, thus keeping the violence in 
circulation. But what also circulated were alliances. Clients compensated warriors by
53 Such outbursts not only command respect; they are considered critical to the resolution of disputes. See 
Danilyn Rutherford, Raiding the Land o f the Foreigners: Power, History and Difference in Biak, Irian Jaya, 
Indonesia (PhD dissertation, Cornell University), p. 202.
54 See Danilyn Rutherford, "Love, Violence and Foreign Wealth: Kinship and History in Biak, Irian Jaya," 
Journal o f  the Royal Anthropological Institute 4 (2): 255-281.
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giving them their sisters to marry; warriors gave their own sisters to their victims' clans 
to compensate for the loss of life. Through these unions—and the brother-sister bonds 
they mobilized—particular individuals and their descendants received special skills 
and prerogatives. A dangerous uncle and a random act of violence stood at the origins 
of a prestigious new line.
Clan myths also draw connections between random acts of violence and the 
institution of new identities. An enterprising Dutch official collected several dozen of 
such stories.55 Most of them begin with a fight over a domestic animal or some other 
object of shared desire. A dog defecates inside a hilltop clan house, sparking an 
altercation between two clan brothers. A man catches a lizard; his brothers eat it; he 
explodes in rage. A bloody battle ensues, then the siblings disperse, naming features of 
the landscape as they descend to the coast. In their new homes, the siblings found new 
clans; eventually their descendants marry. Exploding a sibling set consisting of 
competing equals, the lethal violence causes a migration that sets up differences and 
provides a basis for exchange.
Village histories show how a particular relation to the foreign underwrites the 
connection between violence and origins. In 1912, Lieutenant W. K. H. Feuilletau de 
Bruyn arrived on Biak with a company of soldiers.56 While his mission was ostensibly 
to capture the murderer of an Ambonese teacher—who had strayed into a drunk 
warrior's path—he used the occasion to pacify the island's north coast. Using "local 
methods," his troops snuck up to clan houses and took their occupants as hostages. 
They refused to release the men, women and children until they turned over any 
warriors in their midst. Soon the company was traveling with a string of prisoners, 
bound together by wire tied around their necks. The lieutenant scarcely cuts an 
endearing figure in his report on the mission. But in the stories Biaks tell about the 
operation, they remember him with admiration, as well as awe. "Dekna," as they call 
him, may have been jahat, but he opened a new era on the island. Ostensibly out to 
bring an end to heathen justice, Feuilletau de Bruyn, through these stories, has become 
a warrior himself.
Stories about Dekna are taken as relating a particularly treasured beginning in Biak: 
the dawn of Christian light in heathen darkness. It was in the 1910s that most Biak 
villages began the long history of mission schooling that accounts for the islanders' 
dominance in many arenas of provincial life. But while the flag raising undeniably 
could be emplotted in the colonial story of Biak's march to modernity, this story does 
not capture the full range of readings evoked by the act. For one thing, it cannot 
account for the ways that Biaks represent the military and bureaucracy as foreign: 
dangerous, yet available for present-day warriors who want to advance in the eyes of 
their peers. For another, it cannot explain the persistence of a view of national 
liberation as an abrupt and total transformation. As a fourth and final example makes 
clear, the violence and value of the foreign stands not only at the beginning of Biak 
identities, but also at the end.
55 See de Bruyn, "Jaarverslagen 1947 en 1948."
56 See W. K. H. Feuilletau de Bruyn, "Militaire Memorie der Schouten-eilanden," August 31,1916, Nienhuis 
Collectie van de Department van Bevolkszaken Hollandia Rapportenarchief, Nummer Toegang 10-25, Stuk 183, 
Algemeene Rijksarchief, The Hague. See also Schouten en Padaido-eilanden, vol. 21 of Mededeelingen 
Encyclopaedisch Bureau (Batavia: Javaasche Boekhandel, 1920).
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Punctuated by a series of startling encounters and violent incidents, the myth of 
Manarmakeri, literally "the Itchy Old Man," lays out the origin of the foreign.57 The 
story begins with the hero's discovery and loss of Koreri, which means "We Change 
Our Skin," a utopian state of unending life and pleasure also glossed by Biaks as "Kan 
do mob oser," "We eat in one place." Disappointed by his inability to return to the 
cave where he witnessed Koreri, Manarmakeri develops a skin disease that covers his 
body with itching, oozing sores. The hero becomes a migrating outcast, subjected to all 
manner of abuse. In the key incident in the story, he regains access to Koreri from the 
Morning Star, whom he surprises when die spirit is stealing the old man's palm wine. 
But the old man must take a detour in order to return to Koreri: Manarmakeri first 
gains the power to impregnate a woman magically and make her his wife. The woman 
turns out to be the local chief's daughter, whose newborn son outrages the villagers 
when he identifies the old stranger as his father. Rejected again, when his affines flee 
the misbegotten family, the old man sets about performing miracles. He conjures up a 
magnificent feast and a modem steamship; he turns himself into a beautiful youth and 
his skin into treasure by jumping into a raging fire. But even these deeds cannot win 
him the Biaks' acceptance. Disappointed, Manarmakeri travels west. But someday, he 
will return and "open" Koreri. This final union with the foreign will end the world as 
Biaks know it. There will be no more striving, suffering, and death.
Over the course of a long history of contact with outsiders, Biaks periodically 
gathered to welcome Manarmakeri.58 A leader would arise, claiming to be in contact 
with the ancestor; followers would abandon their gardens and gather to sing, dance, 
and drink palm wine, sure that Koreri soon would begin. While not every incident 
ended violently, the followers consistently posited a reversal in existing structures of 
power.59 Closing the gap between Biak and the Land of the Foreigners, the return of 
Manarmakeri would spell the end of a social order based on the pursuit of exogenous 
sources of value and power. Where New Order narratives repressed all reference to 
endings, for Biaks, this eschatological moment was—and remains—a focus of longing 
and hope.
I am certainly not the first to suggest Koreri's importance to the interpretation of 
Papuan nationalism on Biak; prominent Papuan nationalists have done the same.60 
Scholars who take millenarianism as a stage in the "evolution of revolution" have 
made much of the mixture of political and religious rhetoric that Koreri prophets used 
to describe their quest.61 The reading I would like to offer of the flag raising avoids the
57 See Rutherford, Raiding the Land o f  the Foreigners, pp. 378-461.
58 See F.C. Kamma, Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1972).
59 An early prophet instructed the faithful to stop traveling to Tidore; instead they should deliver their 
tribute to him. Ibid., p. 106. Later prophets undermined the authority of the missionaries by claiming that the 
Bible was really an abridged edition of Biak myth.
60 See for example Nonie Sharp with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, The Morning Star in Papua Barat (North 
Carlton, Australia: Arena, 1994).
61 See Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 48. "The urban and 
adjoining areas of long settlement, then, on the whole found other forms of political expression than 
millenarianism, and the casual labourers, peri-urban workers and small entrepreneurs had begun to 
develop orthodox political, economic and social organizations before World War II." Peter Lawrence also 
discusses the relationship between cargoism and "modem" political activism. See Peter Lawrence, Road
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teleological premises of such an approach. I will not venture into debates on the 
millennial origins of the modem notions of progress that infuse classic accounts of 
millenarianism.62 How the "phenomenon" looks depends on the perspective of the 
observer: the events of 1939-42 on Biak, called a "cargo cult" by some, coincided with 
a multitude of similar reactions that later found a place in the annals of the Indonesian 
revolutionary war.63 If Koreri is central to my analysis, it is not because millenarianism 
is a precursor to "real" revolution. Using Koreri as a lens, we catch a glimpse of the 
eschatological limit that all revolutions in some sense evoke.
The Morning Star flag, which refers explicitly to an episode from the myth of 
Manarmakeri, first flew in 1942, during an uprising which coincided with the Japanese 
invasion and the collapse of Dutch colonial rule.64 While my information on the 1998 
flag raising is admittedly incomplete—and I certainly would not want to downplay the 
significant differences between the two historical moments—what I heard in Biak and 
read in reports on the previous incident suggest certain parallels. The most striking, of 
course, is the timing: the fall of a seemingly permanent regime. In both cases, the 
rupture came at the end of a period of expansion in the scope and reach of the state. A 
second parallel pertains to the participants. Planned by individuals with recent 
experience outside the island, the World War II uprising drew people from all parts of 
Biak, with the prophets and their close relatives forming the core of the movement. It 
was launched by Angganeta Menufandu, a traditional singer and healer, who had 
worked on the mainland as a coolie. After her arrest, the movement was carried 
forward by a group of young warriors who had just been released from jail. Educated 
in the Philippines and employed at the governor's office in Jayapura, Philip Karma had 
only recently returned to Biak when the flag raising occurred. Surrounded by relatives 
from his North Biak village, Karma attracted followers ranging from the teenagers who 
loiter near the Biak City terminal to villagers who made special trips to town to see the 
long-forbidden flag. As was the case in the earlier incident, some of the curious ended 
up staying on.
A third parallel can be drawn in the activities undertaken during the flag raising. 
At the camps set up by Angganeta and her successors, followers drank palm wine and 
danced in a circle, singing songs composed by their leaders. The performance genre was 
wor, a non-diatonic genre of singing once central to Biak ceremonies and feasts.65 The 
leaders were helped by "peace women," as they called male and female dancers who 
had been possessed by the foreign and the dead. Christian imagery was central to the
Belong Cargo (Prospect Heights, IL.: Waveland Press, 1971), pp. 256-273. See also Michael Adas, Prophets 
o f  Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order (Cambridge: C am bridge  
University Press, 1987).
62 For a discussion of these debates, see Malcolm Bull, "On Making Ends Meet" in Apocalypse Theory and 
the Ends o f  the World, ed. M. Bull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-17. See also Benedict 
Anderson, "Further Adventures of Charisma" in Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 90-93.
631 make this argument in Rutherford, Raiding the Land o f  the Foreigners, pp. 485-87.
64 See Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War, p. 51; see also Kamma, Koreri, and Rutherford, Raiding the Land o f  
the Foreigners, pp. 525-565.
65 See Philip Yampolsky and Danilyn Rutherford, eds., Music o f Biak, Irian faya: Wor, Church Songs, Yospan, 
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movement; people and places received biblical names. Last summer, the demonstrators 
spent their days dancing around the water tower and singing Biak and Indonesian 
songs. While they performed a contemporary genre, in fitting with the youth of many of 
the participants, the allusion to Koreri and Biak feasting was clear. Every hour, the 
entire group dropped to their knees and prayed, led by Philip Karma. It is said that 
the leader even "baptized" the territory where the demonstrators exercised control. 
Although I heard nothing about speaking in foreign tongues, people did describe the 
reading of incomprehensible foreign documents: "proclamations" in English and Dutch.
A fourth parallel concerns the stress the followers placed on foreign recognition. 
Elsewhere I have compared the state-sponsored revival of wor, the above-mentioned 
song genre, in the 1990s to a similar revival sponsored by the mission in the 1930s.66 In 
the uprisings that followed, Biaks responded to the sense that outsiders had found 
something unexpected in their identities. In prison, the young warriors who took over 
from Angganeta heard rumors of Japanese promises to honor native political parties. 
Upon their release, they drafted an elaborate charter for New Guinea's future, which 
became the basis of the movement's subsequent phase. Like the warriors, Karma and 
his followers acted in the belief that powerful outsiders had recognized their plight. 
Above I mentioned the letter from the US Representatives, which circulated widely on 
Biak.67 Much was made of a rumor that the protesters had appeared on CNN. As was 
the case in Koreri, this evidence of foreign attention brought to mind not only the gaze 
of outsiders, but also their impending presence. When one friend left for the port to 
meet a passenger liner during the demonstration, his neighbor asked him, in great 
excitement, "Has the foreigners' ship arrived?"
A fifth parallel relates to the interplay between order and violence as the 
demonstration progressed. Angganeta, who called herself "the Peace Woman," gained 
authority from her ability to provide convincing signs of direct contact with 
Manarmakeri. Her successors gained prominence by claiming to represent the 
prophetess, the "Queen" whose troops they vowed to command. In two sites on Biak, 
they drilled divisions of the "New America" army. Teachers and evangelists were 
submitted to beatings; a policeman and a Japanese commander were killed. As the 
Japanese gradually assumed control of northwestern New Guinea, the new 
administration tried different strategies to quell the movement, including recruiting the 
followers of one leader to attack those of another. Finally, in October 1943, the 
Japanese navy opened fire on a huge crowd of unarmed believers. The bullets failed to 
turn to water, and hundreds of people were killed. But that was not the end of the 
violence. A blood bath resulted when grieving families turned on the clans who had led 
their loved ones to their death. Over a much shorter period, the 1998 demonstration 
evolved towards a violent confrontation. Early in the protest, Karma formed a security 
force of sorts. The protesters set up roadblocks around the water tower manned by 
boys wearing armbands that read "Security Guard — OPM." The demonstrators began 
to stockpile weapons after hearing rumors that the military was planning to attack the 
crowd. When news of the shootings reached young sympathizers in outlying 
neighborhoods, they took revenge by burning down migrants' shops.
66 See Rutherford, "Of Birds and Gifts: The Revival of Tradition on an Indonesian Frontier," p. 601.
67 Karma reputedly had other documents in his possession, including statements from the 1950s and 1960s 
relating to the Act of Free Choice.
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Perhaps the strongest indication that the narrative of Koreri was evoked in the flag 
raising comes from the comments I heard after its failure. Friends spoke of Karma's 
movement in the same tone that they used to discuss Angganeta and the warriors'— 
the goal was valid, but the timing was wrong. "We can't chase it," sighed the wife of a 
high-ranking official. "God will give it to us in his time." Just as believers found post- 
hoc justifications for Angganeta's failure, they found reasons for the flag raising's 
tragic ending. Maybe God was on Karma's side, I was told, and the shootings were 
meant to happen so that more people would hear about the cause. The same friend 
reported how, after the incident, a Sino-Indonesian woman had had a vision of angels 
dancing with the demonstrators around the flag. Although Biaks envision 
independence in a variety of ways, many assume that divine intervention will 
somehow be involved in its delivery. In 1998, as in the early 1940s, the violence that 
will end the status quo is imagined as entailing a congress with foreigners and a 
triumph of prayers—if not machetes—over guns.
Conclusion: The Future of the End?
From the perspective of day-to-day life, the return of Manarmakeri must remain 
unpredictable. Prophets who dare to venture a forecast run a risk. Many Biaks still 
honor the memory of Angganeta, who turned her body into a receiver of messages from 
Manarmakeri. They have nothing but contempt for her successors, who actively 
directed the movement in her name. The comments I collected on Philip Karma seemed 
to range between these alternatives. Some spoke scornfully of this "big foreigner" who 
led others to ruin because he wanted to "make it"—i.e. independence—all by himself. 
But others who implied that the movement was divinely ordained spoke of the "light" 
in Karma's eyes.
The ambivalence Biaks expressed in their judgement of both movements' leaders 
reflects something of their ambivalent views on violence. If one must in some sense be 
dangerous to engage in exchange, when Biaks manifest their potency by inflicting 
bodily harm, the effect on social relations can be devastating. When the plan to involve 
West Biak villagers failed, the commander assigned Biak soldiers to lead the attack on 
the demonstrators; it may be years before the families involved mend the rift.68 Still if 
Biaks generally assert that violence should be less than "real," their actions often 
suggest that it must refer to something more than rhetorical. The massacres that 
followed the collapse of Koreri in 1943 suggest how easily it is to slip across the line.
One way of grappling with the "not wholly peaceful" nature of episodes like the 
flag raising is to create taxonomies. F. C. Kamma, the Dutch missionary who wrote a 
well-known study of Koreri, spoke of a conflict between followers who truly longed for 
redemption and those who turned this longing to earthly ends. But the comments of 
those who still remember the movement suggest a more complicated dynamic. 
Angganeta's movement sought to collapse limits, but it also recreated them, through 
the brutal suppression of those who failed to follow Manarmakeri's supposed 
commands. In normal times, Biak justice has no room for an inexplicable death; one's
68 The soldiers were commanded by a Biak officer, who is ironically, Philip Karma's sister's husband's 
father.
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misfortune is always attributable to another's misdeed. The leaders of Koreri violently 
suppressed this principle of retribution by calling for an end to all feuds. The vengeful 
relatives of the victims of the Japanese attack forcefully reinstated Biak law. Koreri's 
violence was not simply the outcome of repression or the schemes of "secondary 
leaders."69 The violent suppression of order elicited its violent reintroduction, in a 
dynamic that culminated in the movement's horrific denouement.
There is little doubt that the war-time movement, like the flag raising, involved 
what Walter Benjamin calls in the beginning of "Critique of Violence" "law-making" 
and "law-preserving" uses of force. But we get a better sense of what was at stake in 
Koreri by considering the end of Benjamin's essay, where he tells us that violence can 
be either mythical or divine. Mythical violence resembles that of the Biak warrior: 
violence not as a means, but as a manifestation, as seen in a man, "impelled by anger 
. . .  to the most visible outbursts of a violence that is not related as a means to a 
preconceived end."70 Without a pre-existing program to guide it, lawmaking, as 
"power-making," must take place in such a manifestation, a sign of the "existence of 
the gods."71 Like the blow of a warrior or enraged clan brother, mythical violence 
institutes an order and produces authority by parading as an "alien" force beyond 
conscious, "local" control. Divine violence looks more like the moment evoked in 
Koreri: the utter annihilation of order through an imagined collapse of the distance that 
divides the transcendent sources of value and power from everyday life. I say 
"evoked" advisedly, because even Angganeta could not convey a pure vision of 
eschatological destruction.72 For Benjamin, divine violence is an element of all 
revolutions, but it is never possible to pinpoint the order-destroying moment.73 How 
can one depict the elusive instant when one regime ends and another begins?
But it may be that the power of Koreri lies precisely in the elusiveness of its object. 
At moments when Biaks are drawn to see themselves from the perspective of 
outsiders, they evoke this figure of a millennial limit. Koreri portrays the submission to 
other orders, if fully realized, as spelling the end, not of a worldview, but of the world. 
On Biak, the dream of Papuan independence has proven remarkably resilient in the 
face of decades of repression. This is in good part due to the groundedness of Koreri's 
messianic logic in the practices of everyday life. By valorizing the "foreignness" of 
government slogans and schemes, Biaks satisfied the demands of New Order 
hegemony without accepting a New Order sense of self. But one should not assume 
that Papuan nationalism is immune from the logic of Koreri, which destabilizes any
69 See Michael Barkun, "Introduction: Understanding Millennialism" in Millennialism and Violence, ed. M. 
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71 Ibid., p.295.
72 See Eric S. Rabkin, "Introduction: Why Destroy the World?" in The End o f  the World, ed. E. S. Rabkin, 
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identity defined by its place in a homogeneous order of nations. To dance around the 
flag is to dance with angels; it brings one into an unsustainable proximity with God.
While its roots extend deep into the colonial past, the Biak I have described in this 
paper is a product of the New Order. I have no way of telling what the post-Suharto 
era will bring to the islanders or any of the many other people who suffered under the 
former regime. Nonetheless, I will leave you with two droughts to keep in mind while 
contemplating the future of Biak eschatology. The first is borrowed from a Biak friend 
who borrowed it from Kamma's book on Koreri.74 The second is stolen from the title of 
an essay by Frank Kermode.75 "The hope in people's heart may never die," but there is 
nothing so interminable as "waiting for the end."
74 See Koreri.
7^ See Bull, "Waiting for the End" in Apocalpyse Theory and the Ends o f  the World.

